Gentrification requires properties to be available for investment through market transactions. In mainland China which has gone through transition from a planned to a market economy, it is necessary to unleash decommodified real estate properties and make them amenable to investment. This entails inhabitants' dispossession to dissociate them from claiming their rights to the properties and to their neighbourhoods. This paper argues that while China's urban accumulation may have produced new-build gentrification, redevelopment projects have been targeting dilapidated urban spaces that are yet to be fully converted into commodities. This means that dispossession is a precursor to gentrification. Dispossession occurs through both coercion and co-optation, and reflects the pathdependency of China's socialist legacy. The findings contribute to the debates on contextualising the workings of gentrification in the global South, and highlight the importance of identifying multiple urban processes at work to produce gentrification and speculative urban accumulation.
Introduction
When the Royal Institute of British Architects awarded a top prize to Zaha Hadid Architects (ZHA) in 2013 for their design of a new mega-complex in Beijing, the news was received with astonishment by a Beijing-based nongovernmental organisation (Wainright 2013) . On the developer's promotional web site, the mega-complex was described as "a large development comprising a compelling mix of office and retail space".
1 It was located just inside the eastern section of Beijing's 2nd ring-road.
Completed in 2012, the new development sat in the area like an alien ship, having been built to replace historic urban fabric, dwellings and local residents. The NGO issued a letter criticising the award, arguing that it would only propel developers and local officials to continue their current practices of neglecting local residents' legal rights and cultural heritage preservation. ZHA retorted that "When ZHA was appointed to the project, no buildings existed on the site which is adjacent to large scale commercial/civic buildings and one of Beijing's busiest motorways" (cited in Wainwright 2013).
The above episode connotes many things about the nature of mainland China's speculative urbanisation. The Galaxy SOHO project represents a number of new-build, commercial gentrification projects that have been changing China's urban landscape. Such projects are meant to realise a completely different land use, accommodating brand new activities that are beyond the reach of those residents whose homes are subject to deliberate destruction or domicide (Qin 2013) . In particular, the role of an entrepreneurial state (Shin 2009 ) is prominently pronounced in ZHA's 1 Galaxy SOHO web site, URL: http://galaxysoho.sohochina.com (accessed 12 November 2014) response. That is, its role to practice the wholesale clearance of the site, involving demolition of dwellings and people's dispossession, to make it susceptible to operation of real estate capital. This role of the state in China's urban development and residents' dispossession are the main themes this paper interrogates.
Neil Smith once argued that gentrification "is a structural product of the land and housing markets " (1979:546) . In mainland China, the decades-long socialisation of property ownership during the planned economy era resulted in effective elimination of real estate markets and prohibition of opportunities to profit from properties. The proliferation of China's urban development projects to install new residential and commercial spaces during the reform era required unleashing of previously decommodified real estate properties (Wu 1996 (Wu , 2009 ). The legal conditions for making this possible were established by the land and housing reform measures in the 1980s and 1990s. However, these reform measures did not automatically translate into the availability of commodified real estate properties for investment and transaction. State intervention would be a means to bring dilapidated neighbourhoods and other urban spaces into the market domain, thus releasing the land assets to be subject to further accumulation and make-over to meet the state vision of urban development. This also means inhabitants' dispossession of their rights to their properties and their place of inhabitance.
In this regard, this paper argues that dispossession (Harvey 2003 (Harvey , 2005 occurs as a precursor to gentrification in order to convert land and housing into commodities. Here, gentrification is broadly defined as a process of "capital reinvestment in the built environment accompanying the displacement of existing users, be they inhabitants or workers" (Lees, Shin and López-Morales 2015: 448; see also Smith 2002 and Clark 2005) . The empirical cases for these discussions are based on (1) China's transition from a planned economy to a market one, and illuminate on the co-existence of multiple urban processes of dispossession and gentrification, which reflect the socialist legacy and are pertinent to the transformation of China's urban spaces into market commodities.
Conditioning 'gentrification' in urban China through speculative urbanisation
For mainland China that has experienced transition from a planned to a market economy, it is imperative to understand the specific urban conditions that have shaped the emerging land and housing markets, and that influence the rise of gentrification. In this respect, particular attention is paid to China's urbanisation that involves speculative investments in the built environment or what critics such as David Harvey and Henri Lefebvre refer to as the second(ary) circuit of capital accumulation. The usual formulation of capital switching sees the flow of surplus capital into the built environment as a spatial fix to address over-accumulation crisis in the primary circuit of industrial production (Harvey 1978) , but China's urbanisation involves mutual reinforcement between the primary and secondary circuits of accumulation (see Shin 2014a:510-512) . In other words, China's drive to become the 'factory of the world' based on cheap labour force requires productive investment in fixed assets to provide necessary infrastructure, facilities and collective consumption. Fixed assets investment has been a key contributor to China's economic development.
The resulting rise of urban agglomeration across the country calls for further fixed assets investment to support the urban way of life. In short, urbanisation has become synonym with accumulation (Hsing 2010; Wu 2009; Shin 2014a (Shin 2009 ). This owes much to the land reform, which paved the way to land-based accumulation (Hsing 2010; Lin et al. 2014) . While
China's dualist land ownership dictates that urban and rural land is owned by the state and rural collectives respectively, two key pieces of legislation, the land reform from the 1980s made it possible for the land use right to be detached from a bundle of property rights and be subject to market transactions. In other words, the land use right has become commodified, laying the foundation for the emergence of urban land markets. The result was that urban governments as agents of the state were given the power to administer these transactions and produce land-use master plans. They were granted a greater degree of power to control and regulate urban development within their jurisdiction. The lease of land use rights effectively made urban governments as the actual managers of state land properties (Haila 1999) . This is further strengthened by the fact that as far as legal provisions are concerned, rural collectives are not able to hand over their land rights to a third party for nonagricultural use (Cao et al. 2008:24 (Wu 2011:254) . These land-derived extra-budgetary revenues have emerged as a key source of financing fixed assets investments (Lin et al. 2014) . The fiscal arrangement provides incentives for urban governments to bring more lands into their urban land reserves, facilitating urban territorial expansion through land-taking and conversion of existing urban lands to put them into a higher and better use. This involves transfer of ownership of land use rights.
Since the 1990s, China's urban socio-spatial landscape has been profoundly rewritten, influenced in particular by the ways in which land use rights for residential and commercial uses have witnessed much higher prices than industrial land that is often hugely subsidised to entice industrial capital (Cao et al. 2008; Wang and Murie 2000 shortcomings of rapid urbanisation (Xue 1999; Meng 2000) . Sometimes, gentrification was recognised as a process confined to a small number of neighbourhoods located close to central business districts (Qiu 2002) . The focus on inner-city or old-city areas is also apparent in some of the latest works such as Zhang et al. (2013) . Such tendency to focus on investigating the presence of gentrification in city centres is not so surprising, given the earlier formulation of gentrification in Western cities (Glass 1964 According to Harvey (2005) , four main features of ABD include (1) privatisation and commodification accompanying the transfer of public or communal assets to be subject to the new avenue of accumulation, (2) (speculative and predatory) financialisation involving dispossession of assets such as pension funds, (3) crisis management and manipulation that results in the devaluing of assets in crisis-ridden countries, and (4) state redistribution in disfavour of lower classes. In the process of ABD, what is being subject to dispossession is not simply physical or financial assets but people's rights to dispose these assets and other resources as they wish.
Thus, " 
Redeveloping Guangzhou
Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, was designated in 1984 as one of the 14 Open Coastal Cities, and has been a major economic centre. office, who specified that "every year, it will be possible to supply 10-20km 2 …which will resolve the land problems that would constrain Guangzhou's development in the coming ten years" (Nanfang Daily 2010).
Another public administration expert in Guangzhou also ascertains:
"There have been attempts to re-vamp the city to secure land so that the municipal government could do many things before the Asian Games. These were to address limited land supply issues, and happened a lot in the Pearl River Delta region. In this way, a waterfront environment was to be created for visitors who were to enjoy facilities and amenities managed by the district government.
However, these changes to the original redevelopment plan did not result in the cancellation of local residents' displacement. Despite the revision to the original plan, the total number of households subject to displacement still amounted to 1,823 (Nanfang Daily 2011).
Local residents' displacement experience was highly differentiated. Any migrants in private rental properties would have been displaced pretty much without any compensation and they lost access to the most affordable accommodations in inner-city districts. Public tenants were offered relocation dwellings where they would remain in the same tenure, but most of these dwellings were located further away from Enning. For instance, the about 600 house-owner households from Enning were to move to Baocheng Shadi, using their cash compensation to finance the purchase of flats therein.
The demolition and relocation notice initially announced in September 2007
gave it two years for the work to be completed, and this deadline was extended by one year every time it approached its expiry date. On the one hand, this indicated the reluctance of many local residents to sign the compensation agreements, but on the other hand, it also exhibited the persistence of the district and municipal governments to complete the task. The total size of the redevelopment site reached 75.76ha. The postredevelopment construction space was to rise to 1,850,000m 2 , seeing a 2.5-fold increase (GZURO 2013) . Upon completion, there would be 720,000m 2 of high-rise flats, and of these, 320,000m 2 were put aside for re-housing villagers. The rest of the construction space was for providing high-end offices, hotels, international exhibition centres and commercial/cultural facilities. The PJL will also claim 460,000m 2 of construction space to carry out village businesses and generate revenues and rental income (Liang and Wang 2013) . In principle, the revenues, including rents generated from commercial and business premises, will go into the PJL's business account, to be subsequently used for the welfare of villagers who register as shareholders of the PJL. Nevertheless, dispossession occurs in a nuanced way, involving a mix of cooptation and coercion, or "negotiated consent to displacement and forced eviction" (Doshi 2013:848) . Local residents in both Enning and Pazhou were subject to displacement pressure generated by various tactics that tried to coerce and persuade more residents to sign compensation agreements. In particular, the example of Pazhou village provides us with a more nuanced process of dispossession, reflecting the legacy of China's socialist era.
Firstly, it was necessary to co-opt village leaders and villagers (through rehousing and allowing village businesses for revenue generation) as much as possible to minimise resistance and make sure planned land expropriation and profit-maximisation could occur. The active role of village collectives in the redevelopment of Guangzhou's urbanised villages reflects the socialist legacy in mainland China, where villagers' collective ownership of the rural land was part of the socialisation process during the planned economy era.
Furthermore, the redevelopment drive was intermediated by village leaders who were thought to "have much stronger and more effective means to pursue their fellows than any government body", making use of their "familial and clan ties within the village community" (Schoon 2013:230) .
Secondly, the Pazhou redevelopment entailed the loss of villagers' rights (Harvey 2005) , that is, the loss of opportunities to flexibly raise rental income from directly exercising their informal rights to housing and residential land. They were placed under pressure to agree to the decision made by the village leaders. In return, however, villagers incorporated in the shareholding system of the PJL would be able to claim redeveloped flats for re-housing and also have access to a share of future revenues controlled by the PJL after redevelopment. How this would change their views of redevelopment remains to be seen. Thirdly, migrant tenants were the biggest victims in Pazhou. The informality of rental housing markets in urbanised villages helped migrant tenants to have some degree of access to affordable housing while they had to cope with structural constraints associated with the decades-old hukou system ). In this regard, they were dispossessed of their right to affordable housing and environments that were more amenable for their settlement after migration to the city (see Schoon 
